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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is the culmination of almost six years of unnecessary litigation that has been 
perpetuated ad nausea by Appellant-Defendant Phillip McGimpsey ("McGimpsey"). Rather 
than comply with valid CC&Rs, McGimpsey has taken a path of increasing self-destruction that 
required IWHA to file two separate lawsuits and oppose two separate appeals, while incurring 
more than $100,000 in attorney fees, and ultimately resulted in the execution sale of the 
McGimpseys' real property. This appeal is McGimpsey's final opportunity to prolong his 
litigation with IWHA and waste judicial resources on frivolous arguments. 
A. The First Lawsuit Regarding Landscaping and McGimpsey's Frivolous 
Defense. 
Jolene and Philip McGimpsey (the "McGimpseys") were married in 1993 and previously 
lived in Montana. In 2001, they purchased real property at 335 E. River Quarry Drive, Eagle, 
Idaho 83616 (the "Property"), which is located within the Island Woods Subdivision. In 
September of 2004, they began construction of a residence on the Property. By October 25, 
2005, the City of Eagle had issued a Certificate of Occupancy, and the McGimpseys began 
occupying the residence a few days later. (Respondent's Augmented Record ("RAR") 
RAR00067, RAROOI57-158.) 
After residing at the Property for almost one year, the McGimpseys had failed to 
complete the landscaping at the residence, as required by the CC&Rs. IWHA contacted 
McGimpsey by letter on September 5, 2006, and notified him that he had failed to submit a 
landscaping plan and complete the minimum landscaping improvements as required by Article 
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IX of the applicable CC&Rs. After several more communications from IWHA about the issue, 
McGimpsey asserted that he was not yet obligated to complete the landscaping, despite his 
occupancy for more than a year. (RAROOI58-00159) 
Therefore, on November 3, 2006, IWHA filed its first lawsuit against McGimpsey in 
Case No. CV OC 0620675 (the "2006 Case"). The Complaint alleged that McGimpsey was an 
owner of the Property in the Island Woods Subdivision and was therefore subject to certain 
covenants and restrictions that ran with the land but that McGimpsey refused to comply with 
those covenants and restrictions. (Clerk's Augmented Record on Appeal ("CAR") 000008-26) 
On July 9, 2007, IWHA brought a motion for summary judgment. On October 31, 2007, the 
Honorable Patrick H. Owen entered an order granting summary judgment, which stated that 
McGimpsey's interpretation of the CC&R provisions was "not reasonable," ordered his 
compliance with the landscaping requirements, and then indicated that the Court would 
"consider plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs upon receipt of a separate detailed 
written request." (RAROOI43-153) 
McGimpsey immediately filed a motion to alter or amend summary judgment, asserting 
the same unreasonable arguments. This became the pattern of his approach, constantly re-
litigating issues and multiplying the litigation procedures and cost by any means possible. 
IWHA filed its motion for fees and costs incurred through November 2,2007 and McGimpsey 
opposed the fees. Hearing on the fees and costs bill and the motion to reconsider was set for 
February 11,2008 and then continued to March 5,2008. (RAROOI27-131) 
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B. Facing an Imminent Judgment for Fees and Costs, McGimpsey Records the 
Purported Mortgage that Allegedly Secures a Debt to a Montana 
Corporation that McGimpsey Created and Directs. 
On February 29,2008, McGimpsey recorded a document entitled "Real Estate Mortgage" 
with the Ada County Recorder ("Purported Mortgage"). The Purported Mortgage states that it 
was made effective February 28,2008 between McGimpsey and Sterling Mortgage and created a 
mortgage on the Property in exchange for "consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) in 
hand paid by Mortgagee." The Purported Mortgage makes no other reference to any particular 
promissory note or loan extended by Sterling Mortgage. In fact, any construction on the 
property had been completed for several years. McGimpsey is the only signatory on the 
Purported Mortgage. Prior to the Purported Mortgage, the McGimpseys owned the Property 
free and clear of any voluntary or involuntary liens other than tax liens. (RAR00069-77, 
RAR00080-82) 
Sterling Mortgage is a Montana Corporation that was incorporated in 1994 by 
McGimpsey. The Articles of Incorporation for Sterling Mortgage indicate that the McGimpseys 
were the only two original directors and McGimpsey was the registered agent, incorporator, and 
signatory on the Articles of Incorporation. From 1995-2008, the only listed directors and 
officers of Sterling Development were the McGimpseys. In Sterling Mortgage's 2010 Annual 
Report, filed by McGimpsey, both of the McGimpseys were removed as officers and directors of 
Sterling Development and a new individual, James Ployhar, with the same PO Box address 
previously listed for the McGimpseys, was listed as the sole director and officer. From 1995-
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 3 
18643-003 (469620_2) 
2010, McGimpsey filed all of the annual reports for Sterling Mortgage, and Sterling 
Development reported that it had no shares issued and no shareholders. (RAR00087-125) 
C. Judge Owen Awards Fees and Costs on Three Separate Occasions to IWHA 
for McGimpsey's Consistently Frivolous Arguments. 
On April 21, 2008, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order in the 
2006 Case which denied McGimpsey's motion to reconsider summary judgment and also 
granted attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. The District Court concluded, 
"McGimpsey's interpretation of the scope of the exemption is so unreasonable, given the 
language of the CC&Rs and McGimpsey's own prior written acknowledgment of his duty to 
complete the landscaping, that the District Court is constrained to find that McGimpsey's 
defense in this case was unreasonable and without foundation." (RAR00168) On May 28,2008, 
the District Court entered a Judgment against McGimpsey for $16,354.20 in attorney fees and 
costs ("First Judgment"), and IWHA recorded the judgment in Ada County on June 4,2008. 
(RAR00175-176) 
McGimpsey filed a second motion to reconsider in the District Court. On May 2, 2008. 
On June 9, 2008, McGimpsey filed an appeal of the 2006 Case. The appeal went forward at the 
same time that McGimpsey continued to file motions in the 2006 Case. On June 3, 2008, the 
District Court entered an Order Denying Successive Motion to Alter or Amend Final Summary 
Judgment. (RAR00178-169) IWHA then filed a supplemental request for its additional fees and 
costs incurred through June 4, 2008. The District Court granted that request and concluded, 
"McGimpsey's challenges to both the October 31, 2007, summary judgment ruling and the 
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April 22, 2008, decision were umeasonable and without foundation." (RAR00184) On 
November 25, 2008, the Court entered a "Judgment" against McGimpsey for· $9,062.60 
("Second Judgment"), and IWHA recorded the judgment in Ada County on March 30, 2009. 
(RAROOI27-131, RAROOI87.) 
McGimpsey continued to file various motions before the District Court, including a 
motion to vacate the Order granting the supplemental fee request, a motion to quash writs of 
execution, and a motion objecting to certain pleadings included in the record on appeal. The 
District Court found in IWHA's favor on all ofthese issues. (RAROOI91-200) On June 1,2009, 
IWHA filed its third request for its additional fees and costs incurred through May 27, 2009. 
Judge Owens awarded all those fees and stated (for the fourth time), "McGimpsey's conduct of 
this entire litigation is umeasonable and without foundation." (RAR00203) On 
October 21,2009, the District Court entered a Second Supplemental Judgment against 
McGimpsey for $11,813.39 ("Third Judgment"), and IWHA recorded the judgment in Ada 
County on November 4,2009. (RAR00206) 
D. McGimpsey's Unsuccessful Appeal of the 2006 Case That Results in Another 
Judgment Lien for Fees and Costs. 
As previously noted, on June 9, 2008, McGimpsey began an appeal of the 2006 Case. 
The Court of Appeals took the appeal under advisement on the briefs, without need for a hearing. 
On March 24,2010, the Court of Appeals issued its order affirming Judge Owens in all respects, 
including his finding that "McGimpsey's defense in this case was umeasonable and without 
foundation" and his award of the both the First and Second Judgment (the Third Judgment had 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 5 
\8643-003 (469620_2) 
not yet been entered). The Court of Appeals concluded, "IWHA is the prevailing party on 
appeal, and we conclude that McGimpsey's appeal. has been brought frivolously, unreasonably, 
and without foundation. . . . Costs and attorney fees are awarded to IWHA on appeal." 
(RAR00209-221) On June 3, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued an Order Awarding Attorney 
Fees and Costs in the amount of $18,240.00 ("Fourth Judgment"), and IWHA recorded the 
judgment in Ada County on June 7,2011. (RAR00223-224)1 The time for any additional appeal 
of any of the four judgments has long since passed. 
E. IWHA's Attempt at Collection on Its Four Judgments and the Complications 
Caused by the Purported Mortgage. 
IWHA attempted to collect on its four judgments. McGimpsey indicated that he was 
retired and had no discretionary income. IWHA attempted several bank garnishments that were 
unsuccessful; the second garnishment uncovered $300 which McGimpsey claimed as exempt. 
(RAR00226) 
IWHA noted that the McGimpseys owned a valuable home, but the Purported Mortgage 
had priority over the IWHA judgments and it was unclear how much debt the Purported 
Mortgage secured. IWHA recognized that a sheriff sale on the home would likely be 
unsuccessful because bidders would be deterred by the mortgage in an undisclosed amount 
and/or the likelihood of having to litigate with McGimpsey about the Purported Mortgage. 
I McGimpsey filed a second appeal on September 14,2010, challenging Judge Owen's orders 
that required McGimpsey to appear for a debtor exam and that denied McGimpsey's motion to 
quash the subpoena related to the debtor exam. In an Order Dismissing Appeal issued on October 
28,2010, McGimpsey's second appeal was dismissed sua sponte by this Court because the appeal 
was not from a final, appealable order or judgment. 
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Therefore, IWHA went forward with a debtor exam to determine whether the Purported 
Mortgage to Sterling Mortgage was legitimate, whether there was sufficient equity in the 
Property notwithstanding any amounts secured by the Purported Mortgage, and/or whether the 
.McGimpseys had other non-exempt assets for execution. 
After failing to appear for the initial debtor exam hearing, which resulted in a motion for 
contempt, McGimpsey appeared on November 8,2010 and provided testimony about his assets. 
With regard to the Purported Mortgage, McGimpsey testified: 
• The Property was initially worth $900,000 but was now worth approximately 
$550,000-$585,000. 
• The cost of his purchase of the land was $203,000 and construction cost more than 
$700,000. 
• The McGimpseys received a $500,000 construction loan from Sterling Mortgage. 
• During construction, the McGimpseys made interest-only payments on the 
construction loan. 
• In late 2006, the McGimpseys moved into the completed residence and in May of 
2007 the construction loan was converted into a proprietary reverse mortgage. 
• The reverse mortgage allows the McGimpseys to avoid paying any interest or 
mortgage payments on the Property. Instead, the McGimpseys have continued to 
borrow money against the value of the Property and now owe approximately 
$622,000 under the Purported Mortgage. 
• The McGimpseys bought a mortgage insurance policy that allows them to continue 
growing the mortgage until the amount owed is $200,000 greater than the assessed 
value of the Property, at which point they would be forced to either pay cash to 
reduce the deficit below $200,000 or they would have to give a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure. 
(RAR00243-262) 
McGimpsey failed to produce any document related to a debt to Sterling Mortgage 
secured by the Purported Mortgage. McGimpsey indicated he would provide additional 
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documents, but he eventually only disclosed one additional document: a "Promissory Note" (the 
"Purported Note"). The Purported Note is a two page document dated May 31, 2007 and signed 
by McGimpsey that requires him to pay $499,950.00 to Sterling Development, with 6.3 7% 
interest that begins accruing on June 1, 2007. The Purported Note says that it is secured by 
McGimpsey's "undivided interest" in the Property. The only reference to a "reverse mortgage" 
is the stated "Term" of the note: "On Demand per Reverse Mortgage." The Purported Note is 
dated almost one year prior to the Purported Mortgage, yet the Purported Note is not referenced 
in the Purported Mortgage. The Purported Note contains none of the terms described during the 
debtor exam, e.g. nothing about how the McGimpseys would be allowed to borrow additional 
amounts against the house, how interest could go unpaid as part of a line of credit (in fact the 
Purported Note contains a late fee provision), and/or how default on the promissory note is 
determined. (RAR00084-85) 
F. Filing the Underlying Lawsuit to Remove the Sham Purported Mortgage. 
Based on the suspect timing of the recording of the Purported Mortgage, the obvious 
irregularities in the Purported Mortgage and Purported Note, McGimpsey's role in creating and 
controlling Sterling Mortgage, and McGimpsey's complete inability to provide the typical 
documents evidencing any debt, IWHA concluded that the Purported Mortgage and debt to 
Sterling Mortgage was likely a fraud to prevent IWHA from collecting its judgments from the 
McGimpseys' substantial equity in the Property. After giving McGimpsey every opportunity to 
stop with his fraud and enter into negotiations to pay his debt, IWHA was forced to bring the 
underlying lawsuit that is now the subject of this appeal. 
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On April 1, 2011, IWHA filed its Complaint seeking (1) an order that the Purported 
Mortgage is void and/or secures no monies and (2) an order that the Property shall be executed 
upon and sold at sheriff sale with the proceeds to pay both IWHA's judgment liens on the 
Property and IWHA's additional attorney fees and costs expended for this lawsuit. (CAR 
000008-26) 
On April 26, 2011, IWHA served Sterling Mortgage, through its newly appointed 
director James Ployhar, with the Complaint and Summons and IWHA's first set of discovery 
requests. (RAR000254, RAR00324-337) By way of the Complaint, Mr. Ployhar and Sterling 
Mortgage were put on notice that IWHA was seeking to void its lien interest in the Property 
because it secured no debt and/or was fraudulent. (CAR 000021-25) In addition, the discovery 
requests asked Mr. Ployhar and Sterling Mortgage to admit that the Purported Mortgage did not 
secure any loan to the McGimpseys and that Sterling Mortgage had no documents to evidence 
any loan to the McGimpseys. (RAR00329-332) For obvious reasons, Mr. Ployhar and Sterling 
Mortgage refused to get involved in the fraud so they failed to respond to the Complaint or the 
discovery requests. Thankfully, McGimpsey, a retired Montana lawyer without an Idaho law 
license, had no standing to represent Sterling Mortgage and perpetuate the fraud by speaking on 
behalf of Sterling Mortgage. Thus, the District Court entered default judgment on June 6, 2011, 
stripping the Purported Mortgage that had allegedly belonged to Sterling Mortgage. 
(RAR00052-53) 
Mrs. McGimpsey was also included as a defendant in this action because of her 
ownership interest in the Property. She was served with the Complaint and Summons and then 
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with a first set of discovery requests that sought admissions and documents regarding the sham 
debt to Sterling Mortgage. (RAR00050, RAR00292-306) The Complaint put Mrs. McGimpsey 
on notice that the property was considered community property and would be sold to satisfy "all 
judgments owed by McGimpsey." (CAR 00022-26) Mrs. McGimpsey refused to get involved 
and failed to respond to the Complaint or the discovery requests. Thankfully, McGimpsey again 
lacked standing and an Idaho bar license and thus unable to raise any frivolous defenses on 
behalf of his wife. The Court entered default judgment on June 6, 2011 that stated, "Mrs. 
McGimpsey has not raised and cannot now raise any legal or factual objection to the Property 
being sold at sheriff sale in order to satisfy IWHA's outstanding judgment liens on the Property." 
(RAR00056-57) 
McGimpsey was the lone remaining defendant. Continuing his pattern of attempting to 
delay and obstruct, he filed an Answer that continued to claim the Purported Mortgage was valid 
but provided no additional facts to support that claim. Instead, McGimpsey raised three 
frivolous counterclaims that all had to do with issues that he lost in the 2006 Case and on appeal 
and which are barred by claim and/or issue preclusion. (CAR 000117-136) He also refused to 
provide substantive responses to IWHA's discovery requests, denying all the admissions without 
explanation. He refused to respond to the interrogatories or requests for production and instead 
filed an illogical request for a protective order. (RAR00339-345) In addition to the frivolous 
Answer and discovery responses, McGimpsey filed a Rule 17(a) Motion claiming that IWHA 
had not authorized the lawsuit, an argument he previously and unsuccessfully raised during the 
2006 Case. (CAR 000137-143, RAR00360-364) The District Court rejected the motion. 
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With the Purported Mortgage stripped through default of its owner, IWHA proceeded 
with summary judgment for execution on the Property in order to satisfy all amounts owed by 
McGimpsey from his litigation against IWHA. (CAR 000166-188; RAR00060-64 and 
RAR00347-358) IWHA's counsel filed its initial briefing in support of summary judgment and 
then subsequently filed a brief clarifying that IWHA was seeking summary judgment as to all 
issues, including McGimpsey's frivolous counterclaims that were "barred by the doctrines of 
claim and/or issue preclusion." (CAR 000189-190) 
In opposition to summary judgment, McGimpsey raised four issues that are now issues 
on appeal: Mrs. McGimpsey had a separate ownership interest in the Property that could not be 
used to satisfy the judgments against her spouse; the Fourth Judgment could not be paid out of 
the execution sale proceeds because it was not mentioned in the Complaint; the default judgment 
against Sterling Mortgage improperly voided the Purported Mortgage, which issue should have 
been resolved through a fraudulent transfer trial; and the counterclaims should not be dismissed. 
McGimpsey raised several other additional frivolous defenses that he has not raised on appeal. 
(CAR 000192-215) 
In its reply, IWHA pointed out the obvious flaws in McGimpsey's defenses: only Mrs. 
McGimpsey had standing to claim her interest was a separate property interest, which she had 
not done and was precluded from arguing by her default judgment; the Property was community 
property and subject to either spouse's debt under Idaho law; the Fourth Judgment was properly 
recorded as a lien and the failure to mention it in the Complaint was harmless and irrelevant; the 
Purported Mortgage was properly voided by default judgment against the only party with a claim 
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to the lien and that default judgment mooted the fraudulent transfer claim; and the counterclaims 
were all clearly barred and were properly at issue in the summary judgment motion. 
(RAR00366-380) These obvious flaws are pointed out again in this brief. 
On August 29, 2011, the Court orally granted summary judgment and issued a Final 
Judgment for IWHA. (CAR 000218) On October 4,2011, the Court issued its Order Granting 
Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment and Thereby Approving Foreclosure on Real 
Property, Dismissing Counterclaims, and Awarding Attorney Fees ("SJ Order"). The SJ Order 
granted all of the relief that IWHA had sought: execution and sale of the Property pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 11-101 et seq., with proceeds used to pay first the McGimpsey's homestead claim 
and then the liens on the property and the additional fees that would be awarded to IWHA in the 
case, with any surplus proceeds returned to the Court for further order. The SJ Order also 
concluded that McGimpsey's defense of the litigation continued to be frivolous. (CAR 000220-
225) 
IWHA submitted its memorandum of fees and costs. (CAR 000226-237) In his 
opposition brief, McGimpsey argued (which argument it renews on appeal) that IWHA could 
only seek to recover fees it had actually paid to counsel, not fees that had been incurred but 
remained unpaid. (CAR 000251-266, CAR 000277-284) McGimpsey also filed a motion to 
reconsider summary judgment, arguing that the District Court judge was biased. (CAR 000243-
248) The District Court eventually issued two rulings rejecting McGimpsey's claims of bias and 
his motion for reconsideration and then awarding all of IWHA' s fees and costs. In its first 
ruling, the District Court detailed the "tortured history of this on-going litigation" and then it 
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provided a detailed explanation for how all of McGimpsey's counterclaims were barred by claim 
preclusion: 
In fact, McGimpsey argued both in the lower court and on appeal that his 
submitted landscape plans, including the April 14, 2006, plan identified in his 
counterclaims, complied with Article IX of the CC&Rs. In other words, having had 
that opportunity (which he in fact took advantage of), he cannot now challenge 
either the judgments or the results from the 2006 litigation. 
However, McGimpsey ignores the impact of the Court of Appeals decision and 
the fact he essentially made equivalent claims before that court. In response to an 
equivalent claim, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows: 
" ... Moreover, even assuming that McGimpsey had sufficiently raised the issue 
[of whether landscaping plans had been properly submitted], his argument is 
without merit. While prior submission and approval of the landscaping plans was 
required, that requirement did not bear upon the applicability of Section 9 or the 
time frame for completion of landscaping." 
(RAR00213-214) ... 
Likewise, while counterclaim three is entitled "unjust enrichment," its success 
relies on a successful challenge to the validity of the judgments from the 2006 case. 
In other words, in order to establish any unjust enrichment claim, the judgments 
would have to be invalid. Since he cannot use this litigation to do that, this 
counterclaim fails and the Court's decision granting summary judgment was correct. 
(CAR 000286-299, CAR 000298-299). The District Court then issued its Order Granting 
Attorney Fees and Denying Rule 59(e) Motion, which explained: 
[B]ut for McGimpsey's obstreperous behavior, this entire case was very 
straightforward, uncomplicated and easy to decide. While McGimpsey also 
voices some concern about when the judgments from other cases were recorded, 
as the Court told him, the propriety of those judgments is not before the Court. 
The issues here were focused on whether Sterling Mortgage's mortgage was 
valid. Once default judgment was entered against Sterling Mortgage, 
invalidating the mortgage, any judgments recorded by Island Woods advanced 
in priority and Sterling Mortgage's lien would not prevent Island Woods from 
executing against McGimpsey's property. 
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(CAR 000319) The District Court determined IWHA was the prevailing party -- "McGimpsey 
succeeded in no way on any matter before this Court" - entitled to all its fees and costs incurred 
in a lawsuit that McGimpsey "defended unreasonably, without foundation, and for the purpose of 
increasing costs to Island Woods." The District Court explained: 
... McGimpsey raised not one legitimate issue. 
In this case, the evidence clearly establishes that Philip McGimpsey had no 
plausible defense to Island Woods' claims and that there was no basis for any of 
his counterclaims. As discussed in the Court's December 22, 2011 
Memorandum, McGimpsey and his wife formed the very corporation, Sterling 
Mortgage, that had an alleged mortgage recorded against McGimpsey's 
property, claiming it was an arm's length transaction, and then used the alleged 
mortgage to thwart Island Woods' attempt to collect previously imposed costs 
and fees for his frivolous conduct in his other litigation with Island Woods, and 
on appeal. After reviewing the documents filed in support of Island Woods' 
litigation, and the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court finds that Philip 
McGimpsey has engaged in a pattern of filing material in court, lacking a legal 
basis or merit, and is often irrational making an award in this case necessary. 
Based on this record, and from the prior litigation presented to this Court by 
Island Woods, the Court finds that McGimpsey is using the justice system to 
harass Island Woods, and his litigious behavior is burdening the courts with 
repetitious and unnecessary litigation. What clearly started as a simple matter 
has become a burdensome and wasteful enterprise. 
(CAR 000322) The District Court rejected any argument that fees must have been "actually 
paid" by the client in order to be awarded, citing Futrell v. Martin, 100 Idaho 473, 479,600 P.2d 
777, 783 (1979) (ld.). Finally, the District Court concluded that the attorney fees and costs 
requested were reasonable: "This case was hard fought and its resolution required extensive 
effort by Island Woods because McGimpsey filed frivolous motions and responses .... This 
litigation should not have been necessary. Island Woods should not have to bear the costs of this 
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litigation. Any costs incurred were the direct result of McGimpsey's failure to behave 
reasonably." (CAR 000323-324) 
On January 12, 2012, the District Court issued the Supplemental Judgment for 
$21,306.40, which was recorded that same day in Ada County. (CAR 000327-328) On 
January 27,2012, an Amended Writ of Execution was issued and then forwarded to the Ada 
County Sheriff, along with the SJ Order, with instructions to execute upon the Property. 
McGimpsey next filed three additional motions seeking to stay the execution. His Rule 
59( e) Motion to Vacate or Amend Supplemental Judgment was summarily dismissed two days 
after McGimpsey filed his brief in support. His Rule 62 Motion for Stay of Execution and 
Sheriffs Sale and his Motion to Quash Amended Writ of Execution were both denied on 
March 19,2012 after a hearing. (ROA00330-351, RAR00395-404, CAR 000358-360) 
The original sheriff sale of the Property was set for February 28, 2012. On 
February 17,2012, Defendant McGimpsey filed his Notice of Appeal. (CAR 000352-355) The 
appeal created a fourteen day statutory stay of execution and caused the first execution sale to be 
cancelled. The sale was eventually reset for March 27, 2012. On March 19th, McGimpsey filed 
one more pleading to stop the sale, an Application for Ex Parte Temporary Stay to this Court 
("Temporary Stay Motion"). The sale went forward on March 2ih, and the Property was sold to 
a third-party. McGimpsey retains his statutory redemption rights for six months. The proceeds 
of the sale went first to the McGimpseys for their $100,000 homestead exemption and then to 
pay the multiple judgments to IWHA, with approximately $90,000 in surplus proceeds. On 
March 28th, this Court issued its Order denying the Temporary Stay Motion. 
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On March 30,2012, IWHA filed a supplemental request for its fees and costs incurred in 
responding to the many motions and other challenges brought by McGimpsey after the SJ Order. 
IWHA also asked the Court to retain an additional $20,000 from the execution sale proceeds in 
the event that IWHA is required to litigate this appeal and is ultimately awarded. attorney fees 
and costs. (RAR00407-438) On May 24,2012, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and 
Order that awarded the supplemental fees and costs and also granted the request to set aside the 
additional $20,000 from the surplus proceeds. The Court explained: 
The history of this litigation is beset with McGimpsey's delay tactics and 
repeated motions filed without foundation. McGimpsey caused this litigation by 
simply refusing to landscape his yard. Island Woods is an upscale subdivision 
and McGimpsey would not landscape his yard. Like the litigant in Peasley, 
because he represents himself, he is not incurring any costs for his actions. He 
has proven himself more interested in abusing the homeowner's association than 
in resolving this litigation reasonably. Furthermore, by creating this "mortgage 
company" in Montana and having it file a "mortgage" against what he testified 
is his only asset, he was attempting to insure he would not incur any costs. He 
then sought to harass the non-profit homeowner's association by repeatedly 
filing nonsensical motions and memoranda clearly designed to do nothing but 
prolong this litigation. McGimpsey has shown a willingness to go outside the 
law, as demonstrated by his fabricated mortgage, in order to prevent a recovery 
on judgments owed. McGimpsey testified that he has no other assets besides the 
Property that has now been executed upon. Thus, the only funds now available 
for attorney fees and costs are those surplus funds being held by the court. 
Analogous to the indigent appellee in Peasley, Island Woods, as a non-profit 
organization, represents its homeowners and relies on those homeowners to 
contribute through dues. It is not a money making organization. Those fees and 
costs have now reached over $100,000 where all it was trying to do was to 
enforce its CC&Rs. 
This Court determined that based on the facts of the previous litigation, the 
subsequent appeal and the current litigation that attorney fees and costs should 
be awarded to Island Woods under I.e. § 12-121. The current appeal is not 
unlike the prior one. McGimpsey has been and is continuously told his actions 
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are frivolous. The Court of Appeals found that McGimpsey's arguments were 
frivolous and awarded Island Woods $18,240.00 in fees and costs. The issues in 
the present action are extremely similar to those found in the previous litigation 
and appeal. Island Woods represented to the Court that in responding to 
McGimpsey's various arguments on appeal, it expects to incur another $20,000 
in attorney fees and costs. 
If McGimpsey is successful or the appellate court rules attorney fees should 
not be awarded to Island Woods, the funds obviously will be released to 
McGimpsey and his wife. 
However, based on its concerns that should Island Woods be successful and 
awarded attorney fees on appeal, McGimpsey would continue this frivolous 
litigation by claiming he did not have any assets and once again Island Woods 
would have to pursue him. Therefore, in an exercise of discretion, the Court 
orders that an additional $20,000 be withheld from the surplus funds currently 
being held by the court for distribution for a potential attorney fees award on 
appeal. 
(Appellant's Augmented Record, Memorandum and Order, May 24, 2012, pp. 7-9 ("AAR")) 
After almost six years of constant and consistent misuse of the judicial system to harass 
IWHA, McGimpsey now has only this appeal to pursue. IWHA asks this Court to deny the 
appeal, make one final award of fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-121, and put an end to this 
unnecessary and wasteful litigation. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Respondents are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41 due to the Appellant's failure to identify any 
misapplication of the law and/or abuse of discretion by the District Court. This argument is 
addressed in detail later in this brief. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 17 
18643-003 (469620_2) 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
McGimpsey challenges the entry of default judgment against Sterling Mortgage, the entry 
of summary jl1dgment against himself, and the execution process used to sell his Property and 
satisfy the debts owed to IWHA. With regard to McGimpsey's various legal challenges to the 
default judgment and the execution process, the Appellate Court's standard of review on 
questions of law is de novo. Martin v. Camas County ex rei. Bd of Comm 'rs, 150 Idaho 508, 
511,248 P.3d 1243, 1246 (2011). In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the 
Appellate Court's standard of review is the same standard used by the District Court in ruling on 
a motion for summary judgment. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 871, 136 P.3d 338, 
342 (2006); Us. Bank Nat. Ass 'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 225, 999 P.2d 877, 880 (2000); 
First Sec. Bank v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787,790,964 P.2d 654,657 (1998). Summary judgment 
is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law summary judgment is proper." IRCP 56(c). Summary 
judgment is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut;" rather, it is the "principal tool. ... by which 
factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with 
the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Paugh v. Ottman, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52281, *9-10 (D. Idaho 2008) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett., 77 U.S. 317, 
377 (1986) (alterations in original)). 
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The application of these legal standards to the facts, law and record of this case can only 
. result in one conclusion: all of the decisions of the District Court should be affirmed, as will be 
more fully explained in the sections below. 
B. The District Court Did Not Commit Error When It Stripped the Sham 
Purported Mortgage Based on the Default of Sterling Mortgage. 
McGimpsey's first argument on appeal is that the District Court erred in granting a 
default judgment against Sterling Mortgage that stripped the Purported Mortgage. He does not 
deny that Sterling Mortgage was the party of record allegedly entitled to the mortgage lien on the 
Property, that Sterling Mortgage was properly served with the Complaint, that the Complaint put 
Sterling Mortgage on notice that the Purported Mortgage would be voided if it failed to respond 
to the Complaint, or that default was properly entered against Sterling Mortgage. McGimpsey 
never raised those issues below and cannot raise them now. Instead, he argues that the default 
judgment against Sterling Mortgage could not address the validity of the Purported Mortgage 
because that issue had to be resolved through a fraudulent transfer trial against McGimpsey. 
This is a question of law that requires de novo review. The District Court was correct in finding 
that default judgment was properly entered against Sterling Mortgage stripping the Purported 
Mortgage. 
The Purported Mortgage allegedly granted a lien right to Sterling Mortgage, not 
McGimpsey, and thus Sterling Mortgage was the only entity with standing to determine whether 
to retain, release, and/or defend that lien right. Once Sterling Mortgage determined not to defend 
the lien right by failing to answer the Complaint, no other party remained with standing to 
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defend the lien right. Thus, the invalidity of the Purported Mortgage was conclusively resolved 
and the District Court properly entered judgment stating that the Purported Mortgage "is found to 
secure no money owed to Sterling Mortgage by McGimpsey [and] ... is void and cannot be used 
to secure any future indebtedness or purported indebtedness between McGimpsey and Sterling 
Mortgage, [and] ... the Property can be sold free and clear of the Purported Mortgage and free 
and clear of any Sterling Mortgage interest in the Property." (RAR00052-53) 
Sterling Mortgage received a copy of the default judgment and did not raise any late 
challenge. McGimpsey had no legal standing to challenge those factual and/or legal conclusions 
contained in the default judgment. The District Court properly rejected McGimpsey's attempt to 
oppose the default jUdgment entered against Sterling Mortgage: "While McGimpsey attempts to 
raise issues related to Sterling Mortgage and Jolene McGimpsey, since he is not licensed to 
practice in Idaho, he cannot represent either. A pro se individual may only represent himself; he 
cannot represent the corporation because the corporation is considered a separate entity." (CAR 
000294) 
McGimpsey, however, argues that default judgment could not be entered against Sterling 
Mortgage because not all defendants had been defaulted. McGimpsey relies on Frow v. De La 
Vega, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552, 21 L.Ed. 60 (1872), which is clearly inapplicable. The Frow rule 
is only applicable for codefendants facing lawsuit on a theory of joint liability such that "no one 
defendant may be liable unless all defendants are liable." Where there is joint liability, default 
judgment cannot be entered until trial of all the other potentially jointly liable defendants in order 
to avoid any inconsistent judgments. Frow does not prevent judgment from being entered when 
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codefendants are facing independent theories of liability, as in this case. See, e.g., 
McMillian/McMillian, Inc. v. Monticello Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 319, 321 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Frow has 
no bearing on this case, however. Although [the defaulted codefendant] and [the other 
defendant] share closely related interests, they were not codefendants facing lawsuit on a theory 
of joint liability, where 'no one defendant may be liable unless all defendants are liable. "'); Int'l 
Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 535 F.2d 742, 746-47 n. 4 (2d Cir.1976) (" ... at most, Frow controls in 
situations where the liability of one defendant necessarily depends upon the liability of the 
others"). 
Here, Sterling Mortgage and McGimpsey were not jointly liable regarding the Purported 
Mortgage. IWHA believed the Purported Mortgage was a fraud and Sterling Mortgage did not 
have a real lien securing any debt. Hence, IWHA' s Complaint asked for a determination against 
Sterling Mortgage that the Purported Mortgage was invalid. Alternatively, if the lien did secure 
real loaned funds, it was a fraudulent transfer from McGimpsey because he granted the lien for 
the alleged Purported Note that had been signed one year prior to the Mortgage being signed and 
recorded. Fortunately, Sterling Mortgage defaulted as to the invalidity of the Purported 
Mortgage which mooted the alternative claim for fraudulent transfer. The entry of default 
judgment against Sterling Mortgage created no risk for an inconsistent ruling against 
McGimpsey, so default judgment was properly entered and the Purported Mortgage was properly 
voided. McGimpsey's frivolous argument regarding Frow should be rejected. 
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C. The District Court Did Not Commit Error When It Awarded Fees And Costs 
For Unpaid But Reasonably Incurred Attorney Fees. 
McGimpsey's second argument on appeal is that the District Court could not award any 
attorney fees for IWHA. The District Court awarded attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code 
§ 12-121. McGimpsey does not challenge the allowance of the fees or the amount as being 
unreasonable.2 Instead, McGimpsey argues that the attorney fees were improperly awarded 
because they were only incurred and not "actually paid." The District Court rejected this 
argument, stating: "McGimpsey claims that the Court cannot award attorney fees to Island 
Woods unless Island Woods proves that it actually paid its attorneys. He is wrong. The 
Supreme Court ruled, in Futrell v. Martin, that attorney fees can be awarded to a party who is 
represented at no cost by an attorney provided by an insurance company." (CAR 000322) This 
question of law is reviewed de novo. 
The District Court correctly rejected this frivolous argument. McGimpsey's 
interpretation of the attorney fee rules is not supported by rule or statute, is illogical, 
unreasonable and frivolous, and is rejected by case law. The only statute or rule that contains an 
"actually paid" requirement is the rule for costs as a matter of right. See IRCP 54( d)(1 )(C). The 
other type of awardable costs, discretionary costs, is not subject to the "actually paid" 
requirement; discretionary costs only have to be "reasonably incurred." Attorney fees clearly are 
2 McGimpsey does make generic challenges to the amount of fees awarded to IWHA, arguing 
"is it reasonable to award fees to a law firm who doesn't really do the work?" and then arguing 
"The District Court did the work. Plaintiffs counsel certainly didn't deserve the fee award." 
(Appellant Brief, pp. 24-25) It is unclear what specific fees McGimpsey is challenging. His 
generic arguments are not sufficient to raise any appellate issue regarding the reasonableness of the 
amount of the fee awards. 
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not costs as a matter of right and therefore are not subject to the "actually paid" requirement in 
that rule. Attorney fees are only related to costs for purposes of making a joint request for fees 
and cost: "Attorneys fees ... shall be deemed as costs in an action and processed in the same 
manner as costs and included in the memorandum of costs." IRCP 54(e)(5) (emphasis added). 
In fact, such an interpretation of IRCP 54(e)(5) is illogical because it undermines the 
purpose of the attorney fee statutes. Attorney fee statutes allow meritorious claims to be brought 
in court because the prevailing party can shift its attorney fees costs to the losing party. Thus, 
parties with just causes but insufficient financial resources can still hire legal counsel with the 
expectation that the legal counsel will ultimately recover from the opposition. McGimpsey's 
interpretation would mean the prevailing party could only impose the actual costs of litigation on 
the unsuccessful party if the prevailing party could first afford to pay the fee bill. Many worthy 
causes could never be litigated if the client was forced to pay its own attorney fees before it 
could then recover those fees from the losing party. This case is the perfect example. IWHA 
could never have afforded legal representation in this matter if the rules required IWHA to pay 
its $100,000 legal bill prior to seeking reimbursement from McGimpsey. 
In addition, McGimpsey's interpretation would prevent attorney fee awards from being 
resolved immediately after final judgment. For example, as IWHA is financially able to pay its 
attorney fee obligation over time, McGimpsey would then have parallel liability arising for those 
"actually paid" attorney fees. Such a result is unworkable. 
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The District Court pointed out two cases that specifically reject McGimpsey's 
interpretation. In Futrell v. Martin, 100 Idaho 473, 479, 600 P.2d 777, 783 (1979), the Court 
explained: 
Appellants also assert that respondents should not be awarded attorney fees at 
the trial level because respondents did not incur any attorney fees inasmuch as 
they were represented by their insurance company. We find no merit in this 
position. The purpose of 1. C. § 12-121 was in proper cases to impose the actual 
costs oflitigation on the unsuccessful parties, in the court's discretion. 
see also Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 841, 801 P.2d 37, 48 (1990) 
(reaching same result); Application of Robison, 107 Idaho 1055, 1058,695 P.2d 440,443 (Ct. 
App. 1985) (attorney fee request by pro bono attorney, denied on other grounds). 
McGimpsey's unreasonable and frivolous litigation has caused IWHA to incur fees that 
McGimpsey must pay and his argument that attorney fees are only awardable if "actually paid" 
is yet another unreasonable and unsupportable argument. 
D. The District Court Did Not Err In Finding No Error in the Amended Writ of 
Execution. 
McGimpsey's third argument on appeal is that the District Court should have stopped the 
execution sale based upon some perceived math errors contained in the Amended Writ of 
Execution. The District Court rejected this argument without much discussion. (CAR 000358-
359). McGimpsey's argument is frivolous for two independent reasons. 
First, McGimpsey has utterly failed to show what mathematical errors are contained in 
the Amended Writ. McGimpsey made the mathematical errors. In his appellant brief, 
McGimpsey does not even specify what errors he believes are contained in the Amended Writ. 
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Instead, he makes vague reference to arguments raised in prior motions before the District Court. 
McGimpsey's miscalculations regarding the Amended Writ are based on his misunderstanding 
of when interest accrues. McGimpsey believes interest accrues only after the judgment is 
recorded. Actually, the judgment accrues interest immediately upon being issued and recording 
is only relevant for purposes of creating a lien. McGimpsey was already shown his mistake in 
the earlier briefing on this motion, yet he persists with this frivolous and incorrect argument. 
The Amended Writ was properly calculated. 
Second, even if some minor mathematical error was made, that error would not prevent 
the execution sale from going forward or invalidate a completed execution sale. Instead, that 
alleged error would only impact the amount of execution sale proceeds paid to IWHA. 
McGimpsey cites numerous statutes but none of them support his conclusion that an execution 
sale is invalid if there is an error (which there was not) about the calculation of interest. If 
McGimpsey wanted to properly raise the issue on appeal, then he should have argued that he is 
entitled to a reimbursement, not voiding of the sale. 
In sum, McGimpsey's argument that the Amended Writ was miscalculated was flawed 
and properly rejected by the District Court because the writ was correctly calculated. His 
argument on appeal that a math error for a writ of execution should invalidate an execution sale 
is illogical and should also be rejected. 
E. The District Court Did Not Err In Dismissing the Counterclaims Based on 
Issue and/or Claim Preclusion. 
McGimpsey's fourth argument on appeal is that the District Court erred in dismissing his 
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counterclaims at summary judgment. McGimpsey makes no affirmative arguments to show how 
his counterclaims were not barred by issue and claim preclusion. Instead, he merely argues that 
IWHA did not provide sufficient evidence to defeat the counterclaims. The District Court 
rejected this argument, pointing out that "Island Woods carefully provided this Court copies of 
the earlier decisions in the 2006 litigation in its various exhibits." (CAR 000298). The District 
Court also provided a detailed discussion of why the counterclaims were barred by claim 
preclusion. (CAR 000296-299) Claim preclusion is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. 
The District Court correctly barred McGimpsey's counterclaims. 
McGimpsey raises no substantive argument against issue or claim preclusion because he 
has no substantive arguments. Each of his counterclaims is an obvious collateral attack against 
the conclusions from the 2006 Case. In the 2006 Case, the court ultimately determined that 
McGimpsey had violated the CC&Rs and he was ordered to immediately comply and to 
complete the required landscaping. McGimpsey appealed that case and lost his appeal. 
McGimpsey had no further options for challenging the CC&Rs and the enforcement actions 
taken by IWHA. 
McGimpsey tried to re-litigate the 2006 Case, particularly the CC&R and landscaping 
issues, through his three counterclaims. In each of the counterclaims McGimpsey asserted that 
IWHA had lied during the 2006 Case and that it was actually IWHA that was in breach of the 
landscaping provisions because McGimpsey allegedly provided the required landscaping plan. 
The issues of whether McGimpsey had provided the required landscaping plan, whether it was 
improperly rejected, whether IWHA improperly brought suit regarding the landscaping, and 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 26 
18643-003 (469620_2) 
whether IWHA was making misstatements to the Court were all ripe for adjudication during the 
2006 Case and should have been resolved during that litigation. McGimpsey cannot raise them 
again in this litigation. See, e.g., Waller v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 
237, 192 P .3d 1058, 1061 (2008) (discussing both claim and issue preclusion); Ticor Title Co. v. 
Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123-27, 157P.3d613,617-21 (2007) (same). 
IWHA provided more than enough evidence to support summary judgment dismissal of 
the counterclaims. IWHA provided the District Court with all of the relevant pleadings in the 
2006 Case and appeal that showed that McGimpsey was merely trying to collaterally attack the 
2006 Case through his counterclaims in this case. (RAR 00143-52,00157-72,00181-84,00191-
203, 00209-221) 
McGimpsey also takes great issue with the Clarification brief filed by IWHA. The initial 
motion for summary judgment was intended to resolve the entire case but it did not mention the 
counterclaims. Hence, the Clarification brief was filed to explicitly challenge the counterclaims 
and assert issue and claim preclusion. McGimpsey provides no explanation for how he was 
harmed by IWHA's failure to mention the issue in the initial memorandum in support of 
summary judgment. IWHA provided McGimpsey with sufficient time to respond to the 
challenge to his counterclaims, McGimpsey does not claim otherwise, and the District Court 
concluded that the counterclaims were properly at issue at summary judgment. (CAR 000295) 
McGimpsey instead cites inapplicable cases discussing how the initial appellant brief must 
contain all issues on appeal. The standard, of course, is different at the district court level where 
issues do not have to be resolved all at once and failure to challenge the counterclaims during the 
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initial motion for summary judgment would not have prevented a subsequent challenge on 
summary judgment. 
The counterclaims were properly at issue on summary judgment and were properly 
dismissed. McGimpsey has no non-frivolous argument for opposing the dismissal of his 
counterclaims. 
F. The District Court Did Not Err In Applying Proceeds of the Execution Sale 
to Pay All Judgment Liens of Record. 
McGimpsey's fifth argument on appeal is that the Fourth Judgment should not have been 
satisfied out of the proceeds of the execution sale of the Property. McGimpsey notes that the 
Fourth Judgment was not mentioned in the Complaint and was recorded as a lien after the 
Complaint was filed. McGimpsey does not contest that the Fourth Judgment was a valid 
judgment, was validly recorded as a lien, and therefore could be executed upon. McGimpsey 
apparently is just arguing that IWHA needed to amend the Complaint to add the Fourth 
Judgment before it could then execute upon the judgment. McGimpsey is making another 
frivolous and pointless argument. 
IWHA inadvertently forgot to include the Fourth Judgment in the Complaint. In its 
summary judgment briefings, IWHA noted the error and asked the Court to order execution sale 
to pay the proceeds of all judgment liens, including the Fourth Judgment, which had by then 
been properly recorded to become an enforceable judgment lien. McGimpsey tried to delay 
summary judgment by arguing that an amended complaint needed to be filed to give notice of 
execution on the Fourth Judgment. The Court, however, properly concluded that such formalism 
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was not necessary and McGimpsey already had sufficient notice of IWHA's intent to satisfy all 
of its judgment liens out of the execution sale of the Property. The District Court repeatedly 
reminded McGimpsey that none of the judgments could be challenged in this litigation and thus 
all of them could be validly executed upon. (CAR 000299, CAR 000319) 
An amended complaint was wholly unnecessary. See, e.g., IRCP 15(a) (allowing trial 
court to "freely" amend the pleadings to match issues and evidence at trial). McGimpsey can 
make no argument for how this case would have been different if the District Court had required 
an amended complaint referencing the Fourth Judgment. The exact same summary judgment 
motion would have been filed and the same result would have been reached. If McGimpsey had 
any non-frivolous argument for why the Property should not be sold to satisfy the Fourth 
Judgment, then he had an opportunity to raise that argument on summary judgment. He had no 
non-frivolous argument and his arguments regarding the necessity of an amended Complaint 
were merely another effort to delay. 
McGimpsey argues an error but he has not even attempted to show any real prejudice: 
"I'm not going to waste a lot of time discussing why a late filed claim may be slightly unfair or 
prejudicial to any or all of the defendants, except to note that the Fourth Judgment increased the 
Plaintiff's April 1,2011 prayer request by approximately fifty percent." (Appellant Brief, p. 32) 
McGimpsey's only argument of prejudice is that he was forced to pay a valid judgment lien that 
greatly increased his obligation to IWHA. That is not prejudice. 
McGimpsey's Property was properly sold to satisfy all judgment liens, including the 
Fourth Judgment. The District Court acted within its discretion to not require an amended 
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complaint and any procedural error was harmless. 
G.· The District Court Did Not Err In Concluding that the Entire Property 
Would be Sold and All Non-Exempt Proceeds Would Be Used to Pay for the 
Judgment Liens on the Property. 
McGimpsey's sixth argument on appeal is that the Property could not be executed upon 
and sold to satisfY the money judgments recorded against the Property because those money 
judgments were against him personally but the Property was owned by he and his wife as tenants 
in common. The District Court rejected this argument on two separate legal basis, standing and 
Idaho's community property law: 
The execution proceeds were acquired from community property. There is a 
"general presumption that all property acquired during marriage is community 
property. The presumption places the burden of persuasion on the party 
asserting the separate character of the assets. That party must prove that the 
property is separate with reasonable certainty and particularity." Speer v. 
Quinlan, In and For Lewis County, 96 Idaho 119, 131,525 P.2d 314,326 
(1973). The McGimpseys have failed to rebut this presumption. While 
McGimpsey argues that a showing is required of the respective ownership 
interests, Jolene McGimpsey failed to answer and the Court entered default 
judgment against her. Thus, this argument may only be brought by Jolene 
McGimpsey or her legal representative. McGimpsey does not qualify to 
represent his wife. 
(AAR, pp. 6-7 & n.3) (citation omitted). The District Court was correct with both its reasons for 
allowing execution on the entire Property and proceeds. 
This is another situation where McGimpsey is raising legal arguments on behalf of his 
wife. McGimpsey has no legal standing to argue that Mrs. McGimpsey has a separate ownership 
interest in the Property and that her interest cannot be sold and/or the proceeds cannot be applied 
to the judgment liens. If Mrs. McGimpsey believed she had a separate property interest rather 
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than a community property interest, she needed to raise that issue. In its Complaint, IWHA 
stated that it had valid judgments against McGimpsey, that the judgments were recorded against 
the Property owned by the McGimpseys as tenants in common, and that the judgments would all 
be satisfied by execution sale of the Property. Mrs. McGimpsey was properly served with that 
Complaint and she choose not to contest those issues, thereby conceding that her ownership 
interest was also subject to execution and payment of the judgments. The issue has been fully 
and finally decided pursuant to the default issued against Mrs. McGimpsey. 
In addition, Mrs. McGimpsey was right in not challenging execution on her joint interest 
in the Property because Idaho law applies to Idaho real estate and pursuant to Idaho community 
property law, creditors can execute upon community assets in order to recover on both 
community and separate debts. The Property is a community asset under Idaho law and is liable 
for the judgment liens, whether they are community debts or the separate debts of McGimpsey. 
Idaho law applies to the debt because the debt arose in Idaho, from an Idaho court, 
pertaining to litigation over Idaho property, and against a Defendant who was living with his 
spouse in Idaho. This debt has no connection with the state of Montana. Thus, Idaho's 
community property laws apply to this debt and the collection of this debt. Pursuant to Idaho 
law, this debt is a community debt because it arose during their marriage and was intended to 
benefit the community and the McGimpseys' residence. McGimpsey cannot argue that he was 
intending only to benefit himself by litigating regarding the landscaping of the marital residence. 
Under Idaho law, community debt can be recovered from all community assets. See, e.g., Hegg 
v. IR.S, 136 Idaho 61, 63, 28 P.3d 1004, 1006 (2001) ("Community assets may be reached to 
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satisfY a debt incurred by one spouse's fraud committed during marriage even if the other spouse 
is completely innocent of the fraud and has no personal liability where the fraud benefits the 
community or occurs during the spouse's management of the community."); Vail v. Vail, 117 
Idaho 520, 521, 789 P .2d 208, 209 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) ("We begin by recognizing that parties 
have rights given to them by law ... [and] that community debts generally are to be paid with 
community property."). 
Of course, even if the judgments entered against McGimpsey were considered his 
separate debts, they could still be recovered against any community assets, including community 
real property. See Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc. v. Lecheminant, 149 Idaho 467, 471, 235 
P.3d 1188, 1192 (2010) ("The Lecheminants are mistaken because the debt does not need to be 
incurred for the benefit of the community in order for the community to be liable. This Court 
and the court of appeals have held that separate debts of either spouse may be paid from 
community property."); Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 173,898 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Idaho,1995); 
Holt v. Empey, 178 P. 703, 704 (Idaho 1919); see also In re Marriage of Scoffield, 258 Mont. 
337, 341-342, 852 P.2d 664, 667 (Mont. 1993) (defining marital asset as "property acquired 
during marriage by either party" and marital debt as "debt incurred by either party during 
marriage"). Whether the debt is considered a community debt or McGimpsey's separate debt, it 
can be recovered against any community asset. 
The Property is real estate located in Idaho and therefore is subject to Idaho law. Case 
law holds that real property purchased in a community property state is subject to the community 
property laws of that state, i.e. the situs of the real property is determinative. See Restatement 
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(Second) of Conflicts § 234 (1971). ("The effect of marriage upon an interest in land acquired by 
either or both of the spouses during coverture is determined by the law of the state where the 
land is."). It is, therefore, irrelevant that the McGimpseys were initially married in a non-
community property state or that they were· residing in a non-community property state when 
they purchased the Property. See In re Marriage of Grecian, 777 P.2d 283 (Mont.l989) ("The 
present case involves property located in California and the domicile of the parties has always 
been Montana. The Montana courts do not have jurisdiction over real property located outside 
its jurisdiction, nor would Montana law apply."). 
It is also not determinative that the McGimpseys decided to own the Property as tenants 
in common. See, e.g., 15 Am. 1ur. 2d Community Property § 19 ("The form in which title to 
property stands and the name under which property is held generally is not determinative of the 
classification of the property as separate or community."). Idaho law determines the ownership 
of properly based on the source of the funds used to purchase the property. See Winn v. Winn, 
105 Idaho 811, 813,673 P.2d 411,413 (1983); Stanger v. Stanger, 98 Idaho 725, 728, 571 P.2d 
1126, 1129 (1977) ("The status of property acquired during marriage is determined by the funds 
with which it is purchased."); Cargill v. Hancock, 92 Idaho 460, 464, 444 P.2d 421,425 (1968) 
(holding that the central question in determining the character of property acquired during the 
marriage is the source of the funds with which it was purchased). If half of the source funds 
were separate property of one of the spouses, then titling the property as tenants in common will 
avoid any commingling and will keep the funds separate. See Idaho Code § 32-903 (Separate 
property is defined as "[a]ll other property of either the husband or the wife owned by him or her 
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before marriage, and that acquired afterward ... either by gift, bequest, devise or descent, or that 
which either he or she shall acquire with the proceeds of his or her separate property, by way of 
moneys or other property, shall remain his or her sole and separate property."). However, if the 
funds used to purchase the Property were community property, then those community funds are 
not changed to separate property merely by titling the real property as tenant in common 
property. See Idaho Code § 32-903 (defining separate property, which does not include separate 
property being created merely through form of title taken); see, e.g., New Phase Investments, 
LLC v. Jarvis, 2012 Opinion No. 101 (Idaho 2012) (noting that the parties "do not dispute" that 
the real property is community property because it was purchased during marriage, even though 
it was titled as "sole and separate property" of only one spouse). 
Here, pursuant to Idaho's community property law, the Property was purchased during 
the McGimpseys' marriage so there is a presumption that it is community property. See, e.g., 
Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 58-59,44 P.3d 1108, 1113-14 (2002); Winn, 105 Idaho at 815, 673 
P.2d at 415 ("Principally, we remain mindful of the overarching policy in favor of community 
property, as evidenced by the general presumption and the strong standard of proof necessary to 
rebut the presumption."). This presumption can only be overcome if the party asserting the 
separate character of the property carries his burden of proving with reasonable certainty and 
particularity that the property acquired during marriage is separate property. 
McGimpsey failed to provide the District Court with any evidence to show that the 
Property was purchased with Mrs. McGimpsey's separate property. McGimpsey has not 
overcome the presumption that the Property is a community asset. As a community asset, the 
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Property is subject to execution for all of McGimpsey' s community and separate debts, including 
his judgments incurred through frivolous litigation against Plaintiff. 
McGimpsey cites only one case, Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 111 Idaho 349, 
352-54, 723 P.2d 893, 896-98 (1986), in support of his argument that the Property is not a 
community asset. The Twin Falls case, however, supports the opposite conclusion, reiterating 
that "under the community property system in Idaho ... when either member of the community 
incurs a debt for the benefit of the community, the property held by the marital community 
becomes liable for such a debt and the creditor may seek satisfaction of his unpaid debt from 
such property." That case then goes on to hold that a divorce effects a permanent division of 
community property such that creditors are limited in what assets they can execute upon. Here, 
the McGimpseys are still married and the Property remains community property that is subject to 
the debt incurred by "either member of the community." 
In sum, McGimpsey had no standing to challenge the execution sale and distribution of 
proceeds by arguing that his spouse had a separate property interest. In addition, Mrs. 
McGimpsey also could not have prevented the Property from being sold to satisfy the judgments 
because Idaho law applies to the Property, Idaho law holds that community assets are subject to 
the creditors of either or both spouses, IWHA is a creditor of one spouse and thereby can execute 
against community assets, and the Property is a community asset because it was purchased 
during their marriage and the McGimpseys have not overcome the presumption that it was 
purchased with community funds. It may be unfortunate that the McGimpseys may lose their 
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home because of the frivolous litigation brought by McGimpsey but all of this could have been 
avoided if the McGimpseys had taken one of several alternate paths to do right by IWHA. 
H. The District Court Complied With Idaho Statute for the Execution on a 
Homestead. 
McGimpsey's seventh argument on appeal is that the execution sale should be overturned 
because "there was zero effort and zero compliance with Idaho Code Sections 55-110 1 et seq." 
(Appellant Brief, p. 37) This is a question of law subject to de novo review. McGimpsey does 
not explain what additional statutory requirements should have been followed. His eighth issue 
on appeal challenges the lack of an appraisal, which is discussed in the next section of this brief. 
McGimpsey has never raised any other issues with how IWHA complied with Idaho Code § 55-
1101 et seq. To the extent he is now raising a new argument on appeal, such argument is 
untimely and should be dismissed. See, e.g., Whitted v. Canyon Cnty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 137 
Idaho 118, 122, 44 P.3d 1173, 1177 (2002) ("[J]ssues not raised below but raised for the first 
time on appeal will not be considered or reviewed."). 
In addition, IWHA has complied with Idaho Code § 55-1101 et seq. Those statutes 
require that the homestead exemption must be protected during the execution process. In this 
matter, the homestead was fully protected throughout the execution sale process: the entire 
Property had to be sold as there was no way to divide it; the minimum bid required cash payment 
of the homestead; and the homestead exemption was paid to the McGimpseys immediately after 
the execution sale. McGimpsey can raise no non-frivolous argument regarding compliance with 
Idaho Code § 55-1101 et seq. He has retained his homestead exemption. 
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I. The District Court Did Not Err In Not Requiring An Appraisal of the 
Property Prior to Execution Sale. 
McGimpsey's eighth and final argument on appeal is that the execution sale is voided 
because the District Court was required to order an appraisal prior to the sale, with that appraisal 
having some relevance to the execution sale price. The District Court again rejected this 
argument without much discussion, no doubt because it is clearly flawed. (CAR 000358-359). 
As with his other arguments, this is a question of law that is subject to de novo review and should 
be rejected de novo. No appraisal was required by statute and the lack of an appraisal would be 
harmless error. 
The District Court did not err by proceeding with execution sale without requiring an 
appraisal. Idaho Code Section 55-1101 et seq. contains some appraisal procedures related to 
homesteads, but they are not mandatory. The statute states, in relevant part, "When an execution 
for the enforcement of a judgment ... is levied upon the homestead, the judgment creditor may 
apply to the probate judge of the county in which the homestead is situated for the appointment 
of persons to appraise the value thereof." (emphasis added). Thus, the judgment creditor may 
seek to appraise the property pursuant to the antiquated procedures found in Idaho Code Section 
55-1101 et seq. but this is not mandated, as is clear from the use of the word "may." See Rife v. 
Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995) ("This Court has interpreted the meaning 
of the word 'may' appearing in legislation, as having the meaning or expressing the right to 
exercise discretion. When used in a statute, the word 'may' is permissive rather than the 
imperative or mandatory meaning of 'must' or 'shall."'); Walborn v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 
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500-01,817 P.2d 160, 166-67 (1991) ("Our cases have held that the use of the word 'may' 
rather than the word 'shall' denotes discretion."). 
Here, IWHA chose not to use the appraisal procedures, and the District Court did not err 
by refusing to require a pointless appraisal. In addition, even if an appraisal was mandated prior 
to sale, McGimpsey has completely failed to show how he was prejudiced by the alleged error. 
The lack of a recent appraisal was not the cause of a reduced sales price. Rather, the Property 
sold for a reduced price because it was sold (1) by the sheriff, (2) at auction, (3) without 
opportunity for prolonged marketing and examination by potential buyers, (4) subject to 
significant tax liens for unpaid taxes, (5) subject to a six-month statutory redemption right, and 
(6) subject to on-going abusive litigation by McGimpsey. In fact, if McGimpsey was so 
concerned about how a recent appraisal could have helped bring in a greater final auction price, 
then he should have sought the appraisal himself. He chose not to pay for an appraisal, and he 
cannot now claim that a more recent appraisal would have made an impact on the ultimate price 
obtained. 
Again, McGimpsey has no non-frivolous argument for how an appraisal was mandated 
by statute or how he was prejudiced by the lack of an appraisal. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondents are Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and 
I.A.R.41(a). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)( 1) governs the award of attorney fees. It states: 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at 
the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party 
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or parties as defined in Rule 54( d)(l )(B), when provided for by any statute 
or contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may 
be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, 
that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation; but attorney fees shall not be awarded pursuant to 
section 12-121, Idaho Code, on a default judgment. 
"Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)(1) 'creates no substantive right to attorney fees, but merely 
establishes a framework for applying I.C. § 12-121.'" Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 292, 
127 P.2d 187, 195 (2005) (citing Huffv. Uhf, 103 Idaho 274, 277 n. 1, 647 P.2d 730, 733 n.l 
(1982)). According to the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Attorney fees on appeal are appropriate under that statute [Idaho Code § 12-
121} only if this Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was 
brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. 
Where an appeal turns on the question of law, an award of attorney fees 
under this section is proper if the law is well settled and the appellant has 
made no substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law. 
Wait v. Leavell Cattle. Inc., 136 Idaho 729, 799, 41 P.3d 220, 227 (2001) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
None of the eight legal issues raised on appeal have any merit. As discussed above, they 
are all easily resolved through the straightforward application of the settled law. The District 
Court properly concluded that "McGimpsey raised not one legitimate issue." (CAR 000322) 
These same unreasonable and frivolous arguments have now been repeated on appeal. This 
frivolous appeal is just the latest, and hopefully the last, of McGimpsey's many attempts to 
misuse the legal system in order to increase the costs to IWHA. McGimpsey has previously 
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been told by three different courts that his defense against IWHA is frivolous.3 McGimpsey has 
multiplied this litigation in every way that he could imagine. McGimpsey should not be allowed 
to continue to abuse the legal system. Plaintiff respectfully requests that all of its attorney fees 
and costs be awarded against McGimpsey. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated above, the District Court did not commit error in granting 
default judgment against Sterling Mortgage, granting summary judgment to IWHA, and granting 
fees and costs to IWHA, and the District Court did not commit any error during the execution 
sale process. The Respondents respectfully request that this Court affirm the District Court's 
decisions in all respects and that the Respondents be awarded costs and attorney fees for 
defending against this frivolous and unreasonable appeal. 
3 Sadly, several other Montana courts have already sanctioned McGimpsey for his improper 
use of the legal process during his days as an attorney in Montana. From just the cases that have 
been reported in Westlaw, Plaintiff's counsel uncovered three prior instances where McGimpsey 
was involved in frivolous litigation. See In re Estate of Bayers, 304 Mont. 296, 302, 21 P.3d 3, 
7 (Mont. 2001) (affirming district court award of attorney fees against McGimpsey in the amount 
of $1,500 because he was "playing games" and prolonging the matter "unreasonably and 
vexatiously" and then finding that he had continued in the same vein on appeal and would also be 
assessed personal liability for attorney fees and costs on appeal); Spoonheim v. Nonvest Bank 
Montana, NA., 277 Mont. 417, 422, 922 P.2d 528,531 (Mont. 1996) (concluding that the "appeal 
was without substantial or reasonable grounds and damages are appropriate"); Matter of Estate of 
Barber, 239 Mont. 129, 149, 779 P.2d 477, 489 (Mont. 1989) (finding "no substance in the 
objections made," noting four unsuccessful appeals, that the "District Court file is a record of 
obstreperous, obstructive and groundless objections," and then determining that "[t]he District 
Court file, and the appellate record evince that the attorney for the Objectors is essentially 
responsible for the troubles in this estate" such that McGimpsey was ordered to pay $1,500). 
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RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 13th day of July, 2012. 
E SHOEMAKER P.A. 
By __ ~~-+ ________________________ __ 
F 
Loren K. Messerly 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Island Woods Homeowners Association, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of July, 2012, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Philip P. McGimpsey ~.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 1365 D Facsimile 
Eagle,ID 83616 D Hand Delivery 
[Defendant Pro Se] D Overnight Delivery 
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